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Introduction
This paper entitled as "powers and functions of ombudsman in
controlling actions of administrative agency" mainly focuses on legal
aspect of the institution of ombudsman, in respect to the powers and
function. This office, among the institution which established for the
purpose of checking administrative action, has a great role in the
sustainable development of the country in legal aspects. Even though
Ethiopia has established this institution in recent years many countries
began to develop such institution before century,
The main purpose of this institution is just making administrative
authorities to act in line with constitutional as well as other legislations
principles. The establishment of this institution in 2000 has contributed
for the Ethiopian people in good governance as well as democratization
process towards their development.Ofcourse it serves for the equality of
citizens, respect for their lights and sustainable development in all
respects.
The main purpose of this thesis, is just to make awareness
towards those peoplewho ask what is "ombudsman's role in controlling
agencies action" based on the proclamation, and some comparison with
other senior ombudsman office is also hied to be dealt to criticize or
appreciate the new born Ethiopian ombudsman.
This thesis contains three chapters. chapters one of this thesis
tried to address mechanisms of controllingadministrative agencies power
other than ombudsman, and such controllingmechanisms, according to
some writers, they call it traditional controlling mechanism includes
(judicial control and parliamentary control) and also human right
commission. Under this topic, how courts reviewaction of administrative
agencies, their procedures, their limitation and other related issues are
dealt in short of detail manner.
Chapter two tries to address, experiences of some other countries
office of ombudsman. This part mainly focuses itself with countries
ombudsman office in relation to their independence, powers and
functions; of course there are other issues included. The selection is
based itself on the most developedcountries in relation to the officeand
length of their life after their establishment including, the creator
Sweden.
Chapter three and final part of this thesis, tried to raise issue in
exhaustive manner ill relation to the Ethiopian establishing
proclamation. Its independence, length of appointment, powers and
functions, criteria of appointment, its accountability are some of the
issues that are raised with this chapter. At the end of the thesis
conclusion and some recommendations are given towards the efficient
and effectivenessof the institution.
CHAPTER- ONE
Administrative Agency & Controlling
Mechani ms
1.1. Definition
Manywriters of Administrative law, usually tries to define the term
administrative agency, in such away that, some of them are interested to
list down some institutions and left the other, while others try to define
in general manner but whatever the case is, the term is not left
undefined. This is mainly because Administrative agency is the subject
matter of administrative. When it comes to the defmition, scholars
(different)define it as it fits the subject. Amongthis, one, Administrative
agency is a term that stands to describe an agency exercising some
significant combination of executive, legislative and judicial powers.(1)
while the other definition givenby blacks lawdictionary is, an agency is
governmental body charged with administering and implementing
particular legislation.O And the other definition given by the US states
federal administration procedure act section 2(a).U.S.C. which has
some wide acceptance than the other definition is that administrative
agency means each authority of the government of the united states
other than congress and the court . According to this definition except
courts and congress, are Administrative agencies and beyond these
administrative agencies which have direct relation with private rights as
well as obligation are categorizedunder administrative agency.
But whatever the case is, the definitions given above are not free
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from criticism, each definition is criticized. When we come to the
Ethiopian case, which is of course from the draft proclamation. defmes
the term administrative agency as authorities of the FDREincluding the
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa cities Administration. competent to render
administrative decisions and exercising regulatory or supervisory
function .So in Ethiopian for administrative agency to be called in full
sense administrative agency regulatory and supervision, as well as
administrative decisions are some howmandatory.P'
1.2. Powers and functions of Administrative
Agencies
Administrative agencies do have a great role m the sustainable
development of a country. So to perform their role they are some what
required to have power. Administrative agency by their very nature
expected to execute laws, which passed by the legislative.But for various
reason they do have power of settling disputes as well as issue rules and
regulation. In other words Administrative agencies are expected to
perform not only executing laws but do have the power ofjudicial and leg
islative, which is of course through delegation, not inherent like
administration. Having saying tins, there are some common denominator
functions that are done by agency, among this regulation of private
conduct, supplement of goods and services are the prominent.tf
1.3. Administrative Control
Control of administrative action is a function that can be shared
among many institutions or types of decision - maker's law and bodies
entrusted with law application and creation are primarily candidates for
organizingcontrol. Howevera plurality of independent modes. bodies and
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procedural regnnes that reflect the diverse nature of the control
function. (5)
Amount of power, discretionary power and nature of the power that
delegated to them makes administrative agencies to be controlled.
Unless, there is a mechanism to control agencies, the consequence that
resulted from this abuse of power makes things to go to unwanted
situation. Discretionary power in the hands of public authority always
posses a potential threat to citizens right. As this power is indispensable
to discharge officialresponsibilities, it can also turn out to be detrimental
to individuals.
1.3.1 Judicial control
Judicial control is a legislative power to control administrative
actions by the court. It is through the process of controlling that they
play their role for the good administration. They (court) are powered to
see administrative action whether it follows its legal base, free or
discriminatory and also deal its reasonableness. courts of different
country followdifferent mechanisms but what makes them one and the
same is that, they all deal with decisions of administrative organs and do
have the capacity to givejudgment on it .Wecan divide judicial review
based on its practice in two.(6) 1-judicial review
2- Appeal
But for the sake of convenience and purpose of the thesis, the writer is
forced to write only on the concept of judicial review.
3
1.3. 1. 1 . Judicial Review
Judicial review is merely the most formal and lawyerlyof controls
that may be brought to bear on administrative action. Judicial review
usually occurs after the fact, and in any event is limited to assessing the
legality of particular action rather than the appropriateness, direction or
distribution of policy effort.O Judicial review in a simple language, it is
the power of courts of a given country to examine whether action of the
executive are consonant with the provisions of the country's
constitution. (8)
The system of judicial review of administrative action has been
inherited from Britain, It is on this foundation that the Indian courts
have built the super structure of control mechanism. The whole law of
judicial reviewof administrative action has been developed by judges on
case- to case bases.I?'
Judicial reviewmainly focuses to cheek, that an authority (public)
performs its duty within the limit given; it also has the power to cheek
the legality as well as the validity of action of administrative body.
Judicial review in the United States is derived directly from judicial
review in Britain. The American courts have succeeded to the historical
positions of the court of kings Bench, exercising its supervisory control
over inferior tribunals and officers.UP'American courts have constantly,
"deal with matters of supreme consequence" and done so with an ease
and regularity which has as founded and perplexed continental critics.Uf
The willingness of American courts to grant relief in cases where
British judges might hesitate is even more apparent at the state than at
the federal level.The states have their own systems of administrative law
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and often tend to allow their courts to exercise even broader reviewing
authority than that possessed by the federal judges. for example, the
New York courts exercise wide discretion in reviewingthe extent of any
penalty imposed by an administrative agency, even where the
administrative decisions is upheld on the merits. the reviewingcourt may
reduce the penalty as excessive.This is the kind of scrutinizing authority
that would be exercised by a hierarchical superior and permits the New
York court to play an even more direct role in judicial review of
administration action than do the federal courts. (12)
Because of the very concept of rule of law. the parliament by itself
is under control of the court. The courts get the power of controlling the
parliament by the very fact that it is inherent power to them. So it is not
surprising that even in a country where there is supremacy of parliament
that the parliament is under control. One thing that we have to take in to
consideration is that. as it previously said it is the most successful
mechanism to control actions of agencies. for example if we take
parliament as a controlling body. even if it has its own good side.
practically it is not a such convincing. this is mainly reflected in case
where there individual complaint. in such case. it is not possible as it is
needed.
Most of the time. the question that comes in to mind is that which
court have the power to entertain the case, the issue is not of course
burning in case where there is separate administrative court just like
France. In France since there is separate administrative court, which is
so known in its independence, matter of judicial review is under its
jurisdiction. In France it is prohibited even by law that courts (formal)
are not allowed to see decisions of administrative agencies. But the case
is different is both England and USA.where there is no administrative
tribunals.
nn1~Qn
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seen by courts (formal). The other thing that, we have to take in to
consideration is that, it is not only the legislative bodies (body which
enacts law in the administrative agencies) action that can be reviewbut
also adjucatory power of administrative agencies that can be controlled,
and at the same time there is also principle that courts do have even
power to control administrative activity of administrative agencies.U'"
There are of course grounds for judicial review,it does not be taken
simply, and among the grounds error of law, ultra vires act, and
principles of natural law takes the lead. By error of law it is to mean
manifest error based on clear ignorance or disregard of the law or on a
wrong proposition of the law, or on clear inconsistency between facts and
the law and the decisions. Pursuant to this principle for a judicial review
to take place it is mandatory, the existence of enol' of law, unless there
is, of course, error of law it is not possible to deal judicial review. In a
simple language ultra vires is acting beyond the power, actually we do
have procedural and substantive ultra- vires. In substantive ultra- virus
the administrative agencies power is beyond the given power given to it.
In substantive legislation, unlike the procedural ultra vires, which bases
itself on procedural matter. Fairness, reasonableness equity and equality
are among the elements of natural justice and serves as aground for
judicial reviewto take place.(14)
When we return to, that of the limits of judicial review,question of
availability is the first question which must be answered by the court in
any case of judicial review, unless the answer is in the affirmative, the
case is at an end. No matter how blatntly illegal the administrative act,
no matter how drastic its impact upon private rights and obligation if
judicial reviewis not available over it, there is no legal remedy.Us'
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To take American case as an example, American courts do not
exercise review power unless there is an actual 'case' or 'controversy'
before them brought by litigants with present interests at stake and
where there are no other remedies available other wise, no matter how
important the issue may be for the individuals concerned, it may not be
dealt with by the court. (16)
With regard to exhaustion of remedies, the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction is the rule that available administrative
remedies must be exhausted before resort may be held to the court. The
affected individual is expected to take advantage of all remedies with in
the administrative process before he can seek any judicial relief.
Exhaustion of remedies with in the administration is a prerequisite for
transferring from one step to another step, limitation on judicial review
are some times based up on the view that courts should not intervene
when there is an adequate remedy in some other forum. Whether
particular administrative action is reviewable depends upon whether
such action is "final"or, as it is often put "ripe for review".Agencyaction
is not "final"ill a givencase if the private party has not compliedwith the
rule, which requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ripeness is the other principle that limits judicial review,by ripeness it is
to mean that, individual who seeks redress from administrative agency
through the process of judicial reviewhave to be threatened in actual.
The Supreme Court (US) has said of the ripeness doctrine its basic
rational is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative polices, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalizedand its
effects felt in a concrete wayby the challengingparties.Uf
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1.3.2. Parliamentary Control
Every delegate is subject to the authority and control of the
principal and the exercise of delegated power can always be directed,
corrected or cancelled by the principal, Hence parliamentary control over
delegated legislation should be a living continuity as a constitutional
necessity. The fact is that due to the broad delegation of legislation
powers and the generalized standard of control also being broad, the
judicial control has shrunk, raising the desirability and the necessity of
parliamentary control. (18) It is the proper function of the parliament to
demand the government to make its actions public, to compare it to
justify its acts when asked, to expose and demand the correction of
executive's inefficiencies.(19)
In England, due to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, the
control exercised by parliament over administrative rule - making is very
broad and effective.Parliamentary control mechanism operates through
'laying' techniques because under the provisions of the statutory
instruments Act, 1946, all administrative rule- making is subject to the
control of parliament through the select committee on statutory
instruments. Parliamentary control in England is most effectivebecause
it is done in anon- political atmosphere and the three- line whip do not
come into operation. (20)
But the case is different in USA, the control of congress over
delegated legislation is limited because it is assumed as, that it is the
duty of courts to reviewthe legalityof administration rule making but it
does not mean that the technique of lying is non- existent.
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As it was tried to indicate. the reason why the parliament control
the executive body of the government, is one due to the fact that the
parliament is a source of law and it is through the process of delegation
that it gives its power to subordinate ( lower in hierarchy) body so it is
rational to control the power given to them. the second is. countries
which followparliamentary form of government. parliament is the highest
body of government. so it is also advisable and convincing if the
parliament control actions of administrative organs. parliament has more
power. it can challenge action of administrative by any point it deems
necessary, but still there is a fear since executives do have majority seat
in the parliament. so there is a question on its great power.
There are different mechanisms of controlling administrative
power. Some people call it informal. internal, or natural. while others
said formal. external. but whatever the name is the ultimate goal is just
to control the discretionary power of the agency. The basic constitutional
power to create agency allows congress to become the sole architects
through its enabling legislation of an agency's power structure.Uf But
there are two arguments regarding the controlling mechanisms of
agencies power. on the one hand there are individuals who argue in
such away that the congress is expected to control the agencies power
because of the above reason. while others do not accept the control of the
congress. they support their argument by saying that. such control of
agencies power disrupt the normal functions of administrative
process,(21)
Despite frequent criticisms of the watchdog functions of congress
probably the most effective external control over administrative agencies
come from this source.F'' Legislators have adopted three general
supervisory approaches, employing them as they deem appropriate. The
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first in reactive monitoring is a passive approach; the legislators react
only when some administrative wrongdoing is some how called to their
attention. often through complaints. Reactivemonitoring seems to work
best for responding to specific charges of illegal administrative acts. The
second is sampling monitoring; sampling monitoring is aimed at
discovering through various sampling procedures the reasons for the
poor administration of particular agency functions. Thus. to find out why
welfare cases are being mishandled. congress may decide to sample a
certain number of the cases administered randomly and periodically.The
third is concentrated monitoring. Concentrated monitoring works well
foreclose supervision of administration functions or programs that pose
higher- than normal risks for corrupt or un ethical activities. (23)
Despite the existence of these monitoring approaches. the
possibility is always present that congress may fail in its watchdog- role;
in the first place. the supervisory methods may not be used when
needed.P" Three traditional congressional oversight powers are (1) the
power to create and organize. (2) the power to control agency budgets
and (3) the power to investigate agency activities. A fourth legislative
oversight mechanism. the power to control agency performance through
general guidance legislation (the administrative procedure act is an
example).(25)
Both the house and senate have autonomous standing committees
that specialize in substantive policy areas. most of the legislativework in
congress is done by authorization committees. but their primary tasks
center on establishing initial programs and agencies to run them and
assuring, through subsequent statutory review that the programs and
agencies are being run up to expectations.(21) Authorization committees
have at least six specific watch dog powers to (1) authorize (2)
reauthorize(3) amend (4) confirm appointments (5) conduct investigatory
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research, and (6) veto proposed administration actions.Pf
1.3.3 Human Right commission
The other external body which stands for the lights of individuals
that are mostly violated by administrative agencies is the Human Right
commission. Even if Human Rights role in controlling actions of agency
is not as much influential, they do have place mainly when actions of
those agencies have connection with the violations of human lights.
Many states established such institution with the view to tackle
violation of Human Right, and among places where violations are mostly
occurred are in administrative agencies. Agencies action that makes
them to be held liable are, for example discrimination based on their sex,
religion, race and the like are among some lists, and that is why we call
Human Right commission as one organ to control actions of agencies.
Human Right institution, which established in different countries
with different name, has a general role of protecting violations of Human
Right, if one state ratifies Human Right treaties, that state is expected to
see its organs as there is no violation of this right. Actually states which
ratified this right are not expected to establish the institution.F') when
the issue of Human Right commission raised, the point that should not
be left undiscussed is the issue of Human Right NGO's. The functions
Human Right NGO's perform differ depending up on the purpose fore
which they were established, their resources the geographic regions in
which they operate and the nature of their membership. there are NGO's
which are interested in the world- wide promotion of Human Rights,
while others limit their activities to human light problems in specific
regions or sub regions ( egoAfrica, Asia ) or to specific countries or
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issues(28).The methods NGO's adopt to reach their goals differ from
group to group. Some groups employ preparation of reports, the fillingof
complaints with international organization, and the promotion of
international lobbying before national and international bodies and so
on. Some NGO's limit themselves to the protection of specific groups or to
specific COnCelTIS,fore example, COnCelTIin administrative agencies. All
major human right NGO have consultative status of one form or another
with the UN. the councils of Europe. the organization of American states,
UNESCO and other regional or specialized inter governmental
organizations. (29)
But whatever the case is, their ultimate goal is to preach for
avoidance of violation of Human Rights in region as well as on the world
wide. When we see countries experience they established the institution
by different legislation. fore example, Ethiopia by proclamation NO 210/
2000 established the Human Right commission with the followingvast
duty. Ensuring human lights and freedoms provided for under the
constitution, ensuring laws, regulation and directives as well as
government decisions, provision of consultancy service on matters of
Human Right and investigation up on complaint in respect of Human
Right violations are some lists from the establishing proclamation. when
we see Australian case, the Human Right commission do have a power of
considering consistency of laws with the international human right
instruments. (30) generally what we can conclude from this short note is
that the Human Right commission which established in different
countries do have a role in avoiding maladministration in administrative
action, because they are not confined themselves only to other body.
Discussion in relation to Human Right commission and office of
ombudsman, mainly on jurisdiction will gone be discussed in chapter
three in a detail way.
12
END NOTES
CHAPTER ONE
1. G.S Gulick. American jurisprudence 2nd ed (1962)Vol. 1 P.850
2. H.C Black, Black's law dictionety,6th ed.(1991)
3. Draft federal Administrative procedure proclamation, prepared by
the Ethiopian Justice and legal system research institute (2001)
4. Schwartz Bernard, An introduction to American Administrative
Law, (1992) P.6
5. John F. mceldowney,public law,(1994)p.408
6. Ibid
7. peter L. Straus, An introduction to Administrative Justice in the
united state,( 1984 )P.198
8. Newencyclopedia Britannica
9. Massey L.P,Administrative Law, ( 2001) P.229
10. Id P. 206
l1.Id P. 209
12.Id P. 210
13.H.W.R,wade, Administrative Law,(1971)P.27
14.Id P. 253
15.Id P. 271
16.Id P. 272
17.Ibid
18.Richanl carver and Paul Hunt, National Human Right institution
in south Africa, ( 1997) P.3
19.Id p.14
20.ld p.15
21.keneth, F. Warren Administrative Law in. political system, 4th ed
(2004) P.43
22.Id P. 118
23.Ibid
13
24.Ibid
25.Id. P.120
26.Id P.122
27.Article 11 of the Vienna conventions of treaties
28.Thomas Buergental, International Human Rights in nutshell, 2nd
ed (1995) P36
29.Id P.72
30.Burdekin Brain., Mandates of Human rights conumsslon il1
Australia (1982) P.46
14
CHAPTER - TWO
Office of ombud an in dift ent
countries
2.1. Type or ombud man
Based on their accountability the institution of ombudsman can be
classified as legislative and executive. By legislative or parliamentary. it
is to mean that the office is accountable to the parliament. whether it is
established by the legislative body or by the constitution. where as by
executive it is to mean that the office is accountable to the executive
body of the government. One thing that surprisingly arose with such
arrangement is. most Africancountries followthe executive form of office.
unlike most European countries. which adopt the legislative form. and
ours is also categorized under those countries. which follow the
legislative form. The Swedish ombudsman by itself adopts the legislative
body and accountable to it. But one thing that. should be taken in to
consideration is that. such classification (legislativeand executive)is not
without purpose. tins is mainly because of tile fact that executivebody of
government, do not have a clear and free hand in tile operation of
government. in one way or another way there is some influence from the
government actually this view was tile 1971 bar association
recommendation. (1)
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2.2. Evolution of the institution in
different countries
The officeof ombudsman, has get its origin in Sweden in the 18th
century with the view to control grievances of individuals. actually the
idea get its origin fromTurkey,with a viewto manage or control Muslims
from non - Muslim's but the idea changed when the Swedish king
change the idea in to the other concept and after that. the idea began to
spread to other country, mainly to the Scandinavians countries. The
office of ombudsman has a great role in protecting individual's right to
bring good governance.
The office of ombudsman is so much important with regard to
monitoring and correcting negligence. error. injustice and abuses
committed by administrative agencies. not only this, the institution has
been established in order to give individual citizens an opportunity in
addition to existing institution. such as parliament the judiciary and
internal complaints procedure to place complaints about the
administration. practice of governmentbefore an independent and export
body. As far as the institution of ombudsman is concerned. it is
independent, impartial, statutory and accountable to the parliament.
This unique feature of the institution of ombudsman makes so important
for most developing countries so as to bring good governance and
development in all sectors.
The following countries experience, which established such
institution so early. as much as possible, tries to givea clear picture as
to the institutions function as well as its powers in different countries.
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2.2.1. Sweden
The idea for the creation of the officeof ombudsman was as early
as in 1807, in other words, Sweden can be regarded as the mother for
the institution of ombudsman. and after that the institution started to
spread to other countries. originally it was spread to most Scandinavian
countries, and it was after that other countries began to establish this
office. Even though Sweden regarded the incredible source for the
establishment of the institution. Turkey has also her own share, it was in
1709 that Charles XII fled to Turkey that he got such concept. which was
originally there. by the name of chief justice. which was established to
prove whether officials of the government are followersof Islam or not.
The Swedish ombudsman has a vast power to investigate cases and to
ensure that every governmental organs and individuals are ruled by
Law,(2)Protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual as well as
safeguarding the principle of rule of Law are the main objective of the
Swedish constitution and that is why the Swedish ombudsman has a
vast power.
There are special factors that necessitates for the establishment of
the ombudsman. The first is the historical importance of the rule of Law
in the Swedish administration and the second is the accountability
under criminal law of everyofficialfor his actions when exercising public
powers. (3) With regard to their independence and impartiality. the
Swedish ombudsman do not function as all instance of appeal and they
cannot change decisions made by a court or an authority to act in
certain way. They are regarded as an extra-ordinary institution. which
means. the ombudsman do not supplement the regular supervisory
institution with the public administration. The term independence
indicates, performing of certain activities without fear and confidentially
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or freedom from rule or influence of other organs except, the law so
requires.If
One of the ombudsman's is head of the ombudsman's office, he
cannot however, interfere in the supervisionary activities of other
ombudsman. Each ombudsman is responsible for different areas of
administration. In relation to regulatory mechanisms, all of them are
elected by parliament and accountable to the parliament with regard to
their job description. for instance, there is justice ombudsman, who is
appointed by the parliament and he control the practical application of
laws in public sector. Also there are other ombudsman's like consumer
ombudsman, the equal opportunities ombudsman. children's
ombudsman and religiousdiscrimination ombudsman.P'
The ombudsman has no power to change any administrative
action, his only powers and functions are to investigate citizen.
recommended, and publicize. and his power rests heavily on his
individual prestige. The ombudsman can investigate on his own motion
or by the petition of any aggrievedparty or other person, who believes
that the complaint to be justified or government has acted outside the
scope of law or there has no fair handling of the case according to the
handling of administrative affairs or general principle of good
governance.
2.2.2. England
Countries like England do not specificallycall the institution, office
of ombudsman; rather they call parliamentary commissioner for
administration. The practice, actually, is also exercised in other
countries for example Tanzanian ombudsman named as parliament
commission of Inquiry,
18
In 1960, the British Branch of the international commission of
jurists, commissioned a special research study of the machinery for
investigatingcomplaints against administrative acts or decisions in areas
where there was no existing statutory procedure for dealing with them,
and to consider possible reforms, with special reference to the
Scandinavian ombudsman- (6)
As the title itself indicates, the issues that will be covered under
this topic is, only in relation to central government, not the local
commission for administration, this is because unlike other countries,
England has both central and local ombudsman. Redress of citizen
grievances in local government is provided by the appointment of local
commissioner for administration under the local government act 1974
followingthe influential justice report in 1969 on the creation of a local
governmentombudsman.O
The parliamentary commissioner for administration (peA)must be
considered, not a replacement of the parliamentary system and
ministerial accountability but as a supplement.(8) The (peA) terms of
reference aI"e to investigate complaints by individual and bodies
corporate (other than local authorities and other public corporations)
who claim to have "sustained injustice in consequence of mal
administration" while they were in the united kingdom, at the hands of
scheduled central government departments or persons or bodies acting
on their behalf, performing or failing to perform administrative
functions.t?' The 1967 Act gave the peA jurisdiction over central
government department schedule 243 of the act, lists departments,
which are inside and outside the jurisdiction of the peA. Accordingly
matters of foreign affairs conduct of civil or criminal proceeding and
prerogative of mercy are some lists that are outside the jurisdiction of
19
PCA.(10)
Complaints have been rejected as not falling within the jurisdiction
of the PCA such as parole Board, local authorities, the courts, the police
and nationalized industries. Provided the body to be investigated falls
with in the PCA's jurisdiction then an investigation may be undertaken
but it is assumed that the investigation may only concern the
administrative functions of the department. This appears to exclude the
department's legislative role. (11)
He cannot act on his own initiative, nor can he be approached
directly by a member of the public, he can act only in pursuance of a
written complaint to an M.P forwarded to him by an M.P with the consent
of the complaint, this investigations must be conducted in private, and
the official head of the departments concerned and any other official
implicated in the complaint must be notified and given the opportunity
for commenting on the allegations.O'"
There is no rule that the complaints must be a British citizen but
there is under section 6(4) of the 1967 Act a requirement of residence.
There is also a time limit, section 6(3) provides that the PCA must be
informed of the complaint with in 12 months from tlle date when the
citizen had notice of the matter complained of, and special circumstances
may permit an extension of time.
The remedies available to the PCA are first under section 10 of the
1967 Act to make a report, which is normally sent to the M.P who raised
the complaint. A copy of the report is sent to the principal officer of the
department concerned. An annual report is prepared by the PCAand laid
before parliament. That report details the PCA's activities the PCA's
activities for the year. In detailing his findings departments are subject to
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scrutiny by parliament and this provides a major source of the peA's
influence. peA has no power to alter or rescind decisions. His statutory
powers are confined to making reports on his investigations, or givingto
M.Pwho referred the complaint his reasons for not investigating.O't
2.2.3. Denmark
Denmark has constitutional and legal basis to establish the
institution of ombudsman. According to this, the constitution of 1953
explicitly opened the possibility for the creation of both an ombudsman
and general competent administration courts intending to work along
side each other. The institution was established upon recommendation
of the constitutional committee of 1946, which took the Swedish system
as its model. Howeverat several points in particular with respect to the
jurisdiction of the ombudsman, the Danish officediffers. (14)
Accordingto Danish ombudsman ActNQ.473 of 12 June 1996, Art
3 the appointment of ombudsman office in Denmark is by the
parliament. As to its qualification hel she has to be a lawyer, not the
member of the parliament. The term in the officeis four years subject to
re- election and the parliament can elect the ombudsman and may also
has the power to dismiss.
The Danish ombudsman is accountable to the parliament and
during the institution function; it cannot interfere in the daily activities
of the parliament. The ombudsman is also expected to report to the
parliament. Accordingto article of 13 of Danish ombudsmen Act (ActNo
473 of 12 June 1996) any person may lodge a complaint and article 17
adds that the ombudsman may take up a matter for investigation on his
own initiative. Here investigation can both be the consequence of
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complaints and be conducted (exofficio). In Denmark, any person who
is displeased with action or inaction of any administrator or civil servant
may complaint to the ombudsman. usually by means of an informal
letter or with out any complicated procedure. (15)
The main powers and functions of the institution of ombudsman
are to investigate on hisj her own motion or the petition of aggrieved
party, and on the basis of investigation hel she may criticize, recommend
and publicize his opinion to the general public. In certain exceptional
cases for instance, for the worst governmental offences hel she has the
power to institute prosecutions in the court. (16)
2.2.4. The European Ombudsman
The masheate treaty established the office of European
ombudsman to fight maladministration in the activities of community
institution and bodies. By promoting good administration, the
ombudsman should help enhance relations between the European Union
and its citizens. (17)
Since the beginning of the ombudsman office in September 1995,
there has been a lot ofwork, based on the case lawof the court ofjustice
and the principles of European administrative law, to draft a code of good
administration Behavior, now adopted by the European parliament .The
code is addressed to European citizens and civil servants; it tells citizens
what they have the right to expect from the administration and civil
servants what principles to observe in their activities. (18)
On 6 September 2001, the European parliament adopted a
resolution approving a code of good administrative behavior, which
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European union institution and bodies, their administration and their
officials should respect in their relations with the public. (19)
The idea of a codewas first proposed by RAYPERRYMEPin 1988,
the European ombudsman drafting the text, followingon own initiative
inquiry and presented it to the European parliament as a special report.
The parliament's resolution on the code is based on the ombudsman's
proposal with some changes introduced by Mr. Perry as reporter for the
committee on petitions of the European parliament.The European
ombudsman investigates possible case of misadministration in the
actions of union institution and bodies, in accordance with article, 195 of
the ECf treaty and the statue of the ombudsman. The ombudsman's
definition of misadministration in the 1997 annual report is that
"misadministration occurs when a public fail to act in accordance with a
rule or principle which is binding upon it. This definition has been
approved by the European parliament.F?'
Anycitizen of the union and any natural or legalperson residing or
having its registered officein a member state has the right to refer to the
ombudsman of the union cases of misadministration in the activities of
the community institution or bodies, with the exception of the court of
justice and the court of first instance acting in their judicial role.
2.2.5. Norway
After along debate with public society. in 1962 the officer of
ombudsman comes in to effect.This institution was established when the
commission which was established in 1951 come up with the idea that,
the institution which have to be established just to safeguard citizens
from public administration.
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In many countries an ombudsman system has been established to
safeguard the enforcement of Human Rights. In no way. one of the
ombudsman most important tasks is to play apart in safeguarding and
promoting the observance of Human Rights in Norwegianlegal practice.
Like any other country. the Norwegianombudsman is much more
influenced by the Danish and Swedish ombudsman; its main duty is
"Endeavor to ensure that the public administration does not commit any
Injustice against any citizen and that civil servant and others in the
service of the administration does not commit errors or neglect their
duties. In NOIWaythe term ombudsman has been used in a number of
institutions with different areas of operation. The consumer ombudsman.
the ombudsman for equal status and the ombudsman for children are
examples of tins diversity. These ombudsmen are expected to work
independentIy but still they are part of public administration.P"
Jurisdiction covers government administrative organs. cabinet
ministers as heads of minister. civil servant and others in tile service of
tile government. as well as local government (SinceJanuary 1. 1960)but
excludes cabinet decisions. the courts. tile auditor or public accounts
and matter which come with in the province of the military
ombudsman. (22)
Complaints must be in writing and signed (But with a one year
statute of limitation) from some one personally wronged. has discretion
to dismiss a complaints obviouslyunfounded: since the ombudsman can
investigate on own initiative can take up cases which lack the necessary
personal interest which are state. Regarding investigation it has power to
investigate the right to obtain information from all officials and access to
documents and records (but not internal work paper) concerning its
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remedies the only sanction is expression of opinion with no power to
compel compliance of the change or make an administrative decision. (23)
The ombudsman is instructed to express a personal viewpoint in
all cases. As to its qualification, the Norwayombudsman has to be a law
graduate and over thirty years of age and term in officeis 4 years.
The ombudsman carnes out his control of the administration
primarily on the basis of complaints from the public sometimes he can
take the initiative to raise issues. To proceed with the case the
ombudsman emphasis with the individual constitutional lights. The
ombudsman cannot carry out statements from the parties involved or
from public officials. This written form of procedure makes its possible
for the ombudsman to deal with a large number of complaints, but it also
Imposes limitations on the possibility of clarifying the actual
circumstances. (24)
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CHAPTER - THREE
Powers and functions of the office
3.1. General background
The constitution under article 55(15) authorizes the house of
peoples representative to establish the institution of ombudsman elects,
its members and determine by law the power and function of the
institution Accordingly the house of peoples representative issued a
proclamation No211/200 to provide the establishment of the institution
of the ombudsman.
The powers and functions of the ombudsman are defmed in the
establishing proclamation. In relation to legal foundation, in our case
both constitution and the establishing proclamation provide the
establishment of the institution of ombudsman.
The constitution says "it shall establish the institution of the
ombudsman, and elect, and appoints its members it shall defme by law
the powers and functions of the institution" it does not go on listing the
powers and other things, rather it confme itself only as the institution
will going to be established, unlike other countries like Namibian
constitution which provide for the details of the institution of the office.
The Namibian constitution beyond providing for the establishment of the
office,defines the jurisdiction, power, function, model of operation etc.
The constitution doesnot talk about the detailed powers and
function of the institution of ombudsman. However under the office
proclamation the detailed powers and functions as well as others are
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included in the institution. The proclamation applies the constitutional
regulations and determines the organization and function of the office.
3.2. Importance or the institution
Basically the office of ombudsman is established to protect
individual's right and to bring good governance. At present many
countries established this institution, including Ethiopia, even if it is a
recent phenomenon. Generally to operate in public sector and has the
main function of investigating complains made by individuals concerning
grievancemade by government agency.
This office is so much important, with regard to monitoring and
correcting negligence, errors, injustice and abuses committed by
administrative agencies. This institution strength individual citizen's
participation in sustaining the democratic process by showing the
weakness of state organs. The possibility of changing government if it is
voted is what makes democracy the most strong and enduring than other
forms of government (1)
With an eye to function in relation to individual citizens the
national ombudsman Act deliberately elects to make a single person, the
national ombudsman. representation institution in the eyes of the outside
world; as a counter balance to another faceless bureaucracy. (2) Since it
has suffered access to bureaucracy, it can conduct adequate
investigations and it has power to publicize its findings, however
embarrassing they might be to the public bureaucracy, the government,
and the "establishment". (3)
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When courts work at their best level, they seem to be the most
suitable form for the protection and enforcement of the rights of
individual's citizens. However practices shown that courts ill most
countries are crowded, slow by their procedure. And this entire thing
makes the officeof ombudsman to complement (work together) the work
of the courts. The institution of ombudsman has been established in
order to giveIndividual citizens an opportunity to the existing institution,
such as parliament, the judiciary, and internal complaints procedure to
place complaints about the administrative practice of government before
an independent and expert body. Doing so may result immediate steps
being taken in their particular cases, and, more widely help to restore
damaged faith.
As far as the institution of ombudsman is concerned, it is
independent, impartial, statutory and accountable to the parliament
(especially in our case). This unique feature of the institution of
ombudsman makes so important for most developingcountries, so as to
bring good governance and development in all sectors. The provisions of
service and the observance of administrative justice is the main function
of ombudsman and this duty is not thinkable in a court system. This is
because, in courtroom once a case is decided the loser is only expected to
learn from the judgment given, but the case is different in the institution
of ombudsman. To assess supervision in administrative agencies so that
administrative justice be servedwell.
So the important function that makes this officeadvantageous over
the court system is givingrecommendation on the correctivemeasure be
taken, when there exists mal administration. Promotion and education
are most often effective th311the protection given by traditional court
system conducting research function of the office is more advantageous
than that of the court system. Cost of litigationmay be unbearable to the
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significant proportions of the citizen. As it is known, especially in our
case, most individuals are not capable of being paying expenses of court
litigation unlike the office.
One thing that we have to take in to consideration is that,
parliamentary control is not completelyconvincing, it has limitation, one
is that the parliament become overburden. if it investigate complaints
against maladministration. to take an example. if the Ethiopian
parliament devotes its time to such activities (individual complaint)
rather than mass complaints, the parliament may not have genuine data
to decide up on a case so the result of such activity may endanger even
the rights of individual.
Therefore, we see the need for simply speed. and cheep means of
redressing administrative caused grievances.Wealso see the need for an
impartial and powerful body to cut across complete bureaucratic
procedures to secure a remedy for truly injured individuals. There has to
be, in a democratic system, body, which opens it doors to help the poor.
the ignorant. citizens. The socially disadvantaged. need a body that
speaks in their stead, make them able to catch- up and defend their
interests through the bureaucratic route, which is full of hardness and
complications. These people need the help of some one. Who has greater
power than lawyer or politician to investigate their complaints, if they
seem to merit investigations and try to negotiate a remedy for them?
The ombudsman is such help... "One can easily imagine the
resentment that may be growing against authorities where there are
more and more individuals whose cases couldnot be addressed by tlle
traditional formal and some times remote means of grievance reducing
mechanisms. The ombudsman should step in between the citizemy and
the administrative to reduce inevitable friction between the two unless
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such gap is filled it builds a sheer resentment against the administrative
system, which in effect is adverse to the development of society·» (4)
For the individual affected, the possibility that complain to the
ombudsman will be investigated is of great value. Even if the complain
should be rejected, it is an. advantage for the complainant to be able to
get an impartial, independent body to look in to his or her case. Some
people may be disappointed if the ombudsman fmds no ground to
proceed any further with a case, but the investigation conducted by the
ombudsman and his staffwill often be of value to the person involved.
3.3. Nature or the Omce
The establishing proclamation, defines the term "mal
administration" as it includes acts committed, or decision given, by
executive government organs, in contravention of administrative law, the
labour law or other laws relating to administration. The definition given
by the establishing proclamation is slightly different from other
definitions given by different countries. for example. the Lesotho
ombudsman is given a power to investigate degradation. depletion,
destruction and pollution of national resources. Generally destruction of
ecosystem is mal administration. (5) Which is not actually included in tile
Ethiopian ombudsman. Countries like Uganda. India. Papua New
Guinea, and Lesotho have jurisdiction on corruption on their respective
ombudsman.
According to tile establishing proclamation the executive organ,
includes a government office or a public enterprise as well as organs
rendering administration or related services within tile judiciary or the
legislature as per article 2 of (13).With regard to its establishment, it is
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an autonomous organ of the federal government having its own judicial
responsibility.
The institution has the objective to see to bringing about good
governance that is of high quality. efficient and transparent and are
based on the rule of law, by way of ensuring that citizens rights and
benefits provided for by law are respected by organs of the executive.
when we see the objective of the institution. it has almost similar
objective with other countries ombudsman. As far as its scope of
application is concerned, this proclamation shall also apply to
maladministration committed by the executiveorgans, and officials there
of. a regional government.
From the above paragraphs what we can infer is that. the
Ethiopian ombudsman is confined itself to the public sectors. there is no
way to look private matters; Howeverthis is not the case for example in
Zambia, by which the office power extend to private sector, like private
factory, public auditors. public notary or private enterprise, or in general
private sector which contracted administrative contract are to fallwith in
the jurisdiction of the officeof ombudsman.
3.3.1. Appointment
The establishing proclamation provides for the appointment of the
ombudsman under article 10. Accordingly.article 10 and 11, the house
of people's representative is authorized to appoint them through
nomination committee. The ombudsman's nomination committee is fully
parliamentary one. The nomination committee shall have the speaker of
the house; the speaker of the house of federation, fivemembers elected
by the house from among members. two members of the house to be
elected by joint agreement of opposition parties having seats in the
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house, the president of the federal Supreme Court as per article 11 of the
proclamation.
Actually there was a disagreement between participants during
discussion on the issue of appointment. Some participants argue that it
should be single body ombudsman, while others argue in such away that
it should be a multi- member body, to make this argument strong they
sight the provision of the constitution which says ".... Leading
members..." according to the second argument, since the constitution by
itself uses the term in plural form; it has to be a multi- member body,
which is of course might argument, according to the writer. The
nominee(s) appointed only when supported at least by two third majority
of the nomination committee and approved by two third majority of the
house of peoples representative. The ombudsman should be a person
who can be accepted and ultimately appointed by two- third majority of
the parliament, Appointment under the legislative body helps in
ensuring its independence. However this is not always true in the
parliamentary system of government like ours. (6) The prime minister as
the leader of the executive and the ruling party will have a lot of
influence in the nomination of the ombudsman. (7) The exclusion of
executives from the nomination of the ombudsman will contribute ill
building the public confidence. (8)
The Ethiopian system seems as it is rightly followed,because it is
parliamentary format unlike other countries like Guyana, Zambia and
Zimbabwe appointment is made by the president. (9) But this does not
mean that it is good enough, because the problem that sighted above
should be solved.
Loyalty to the constitution of the federal democratic republic of
Ethiopia. training in law, administration or other relevant discipline or
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has acquired adequate knowledgethrough experience,who is reputed for
his diligence, honesty and good conduct, the one who has not been
convicted for a criminal offence other than petty offence, who is
Ethiopian national, who is enough good health to assume the post, and
who is above thirty - five years of age, are all the criteria's for
appointment of the office of the ombudsman, according to article 12 of
the proclamation.
3.3.2. Length of appointment (Termof office)
According to article 15 of the establishing proclamation, term of
the office is 5(five)years, which is renewable :fixedyear and he! she can
also re- appointed. Even if a single term officemight prove too short for
newly appointed officials to come get used to the working of their office
as well as the administration, whose mistakes they are expected to
correct and its ills to heal. Has a disadvantageous. (10) It is more
convincing to follow renewable fixed number of years because of the
following reasons; a five year term of office has the advantage of
coinciding with the terms of officeof the house of people's representative.
This can allow every new house to appoint the person (s) it deems fit to
carry out the task of controlling the administration under the new
situation created by the voting in a new government. And it is also
advantageous; to create and maintain a viable ombudsman officeimplies
the formation of all effective links. both formal and informal. with
government officials.An ombudsman in his! her first term of officemay
only have managed to lay down the necessary background for later work.
a renewal of the term of officewould, therefore, enable his! her feelmore
at home and canyout his tasks in amore productive way .(11)
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Experience of other countries also shows as the term of the officeis
fixed one for example the Norwegianombudsman. its term of office is
4(four)years.. Accordingto Norwegianombudsman Act.
3.3.3. Removal
When we come to the issue of removal. as there is appointment
procedure there is also removal procedure. which is not something done.
The establishing proclamation in its article 15 lists grounds for removal
of all appointee. accordingly the factors are. resignation (subject of 3
month prior written notice) incapacity mainly due to illness. corruption
or have committed other unlawful act. manifestation of incompetence
upon termination of his terms of office. The removal of an appointee
come into picture. when the special inquiry tribunal report
(recommendation) gets two- third majority vote as per article 16 of the
proclamation.
The special inquiry tribunal according to article 17 will have the
followingmembers. Deputy speaker of the house. the deputy speaker of
the house of federation. three members to be elected by the house.
member of the house to be elected by joint agreement of opposition
parties having seats in the house. the vice president of the federal
supreme court.
3.3.4. Prohibition and Budget allocation
For the sake of convemence and better administration. an
appointee shall not be allowed to engage in other gainful. public or
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private employment during his term of officeaccording to article 18 (1)of
the proclamation but this is not without exception. there is possibility for
an appointee to engage in other gainful. public or private employment
during his term of office. if the house believe that the appointee is
required to make contribution. When we see other countries experience,
for example Indian ombudsman canot hold any other officialposts or be
linked with any political party or practice any trade or profession. (12)
The establishing proclamation states in its article 36. that the
budget of the institution shall be drawn from one. budgetary subsidiary
to be allocated by the government. second assistance grant and any
other source. In relation to allocation procedure sub (2) of the same
article says the budget allocated to the institution an amount equivalent
to a quarterly portion of its recurrent budget shall. in advance. be
deposited at the National Bank of Ethiopia. or at another bank designate
by Bank. and shall be utilized in accordance with financial regulations of
the government for purposes of implementing the objective of the
institution.
Different countries adopt different mechanism for their budget
allocation. for example Namibian ombudsman is supported by officials in
the public service. (13)
3.3.5. Independence, Impartiality and
Accountability
The ombudsman office to accomplish its tasks effectivelyit needs
the nature of independence and impartiality. Whenwe say independence.
it is to mean that to be free from influence or control of other bodies, and
to perform its activities freely. And when we see the term impartial and
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Accountability, it is a state of being impartial, equitable and just too
every party and a state of being responsible for one's action
respectively.Ufhaving defined the term let us see this concept under the
establishing proclamation. To have a good attitude of the general public
the office of ombudsman must function independentIy and impartially.
Budgetary, administration and functional autonomy is also crucial for its
independence and impartiality.
The proclamation indicates that the officewill exercise its function
with administration and budgetary autonomy under the supreme
direction of tile house of people's representative. The institution of
ombudsman is an autonomous person accountable to tile parliament.
Submission of reports to tile parliament is also one kind.
In Ethiopia, the great executive power is rested with prime
ministered ministerial office; also they are members of ruling party. In
addition. tile executive are very influential in decision making process in
the parliament. because they have both executiveand legislativecapacity
tins implies in existing situation the parliament lacks effective power
against executive. Furthermore, tile independence of tile institution
would be doubtful so as a solution member of executivewho have seat in
the parliament have to be excluded from the appointment of the office.
The establishing proclamation authorizes the office to be
accountable to the parliament. Unlike other countries which makes the
office to be accountable to the executive body. Making the office of
ombudsman accountable to executive is not a such good enough it has
its own limitation just like for example it will lead to politically oriented
institution therefore, from this what we can understand is independence
goes hand is hand with its accountability.
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For example. in Mauritius. the foundation for independence and
impartiality are the national constitution of Mauritius. Under the
Mauritius constitution the ombudsman shall not be subject to the
direction and control of any other person or authorities and that
proceeding of the ombudsman shall not be called in question in any
court of law. (15) Except in the case of allegations of fraud and
corruption.U't So generallyombudsman linked to the legislativeare more
effectivethan that of executives.
3.4. Powers and Functions or the Office
The constitution under article 55(15) authorizes the house of
peoples representative to establish the institution of ombudsman. elects.
its members and determine by law the power and function of the
institution. Accordingly the house of people's representative issued a
proclamation No 211/200 to provide the establishment of the institution
of the ombudsman.
The constitution says " it shall establish the institution of the
ombudsman. and elect. and appoints its members it shall define by law
the powers and function of the institution " it does not go on listing the
powers and other things, rather it confine itself only as the institution
will going to be established unlike other countries like Namibian
constitution which provides for the details of the institution of the officer
(17). The Namibian constitution beyond providing for the establishment of
the office, defines the jurisdiction , power, function, model of operation
etc.
The powers and functions of the ombudsman are defined in the
establishing proclamation. In relation to legal foundation, in our case
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both constitution and the enabling proclamation provide the
establishment of the institution of ombudsman. This proclamation
applies the constitutional regulations and determines the organizations
and function of the office. This sub title as much as possible hies to
address issue concerning the powers and functions of the institution of
ombudsman in detail fashion. with the comparison of other countries.
Article 6 of the proclamation lists the powers and specific duties
that the institution shall have and for better understanding it is better to
deal one by one.
3.4.1. Supervision
According to article 6(1) of the proclamation. the institution have
the duty to supervise administrative directives issued. and decisions
givenby executiveorgans and practices there of as it doesn't contravene
the constitutional rights of citizens. So according to this article the
institution of ombudsman has a supervision role. By this it is to mean
that supervision do not only limited to decision givenas some individuals
perceive, rather supervision role also extend to directives issued (from
the beginning). By administrative directivewe mean that acts which are
useful to implement policies for a given activity of administrative
authorities.
But the question that comes here is that. on what basis that the
institution supervises administrative actions? it is simply that the
institution conducts its supervision on the basis of complaints and
investigation conducted by the institution itself. this is due to the fact
that receivingcomplaints and conducting investigation by itself is a duty
given by the proclamation. Therefore the officeconducts supervision for
the purpose of checking whether such directives, decision, and practices
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complywith the rights of citizens as enshrined under the constitution as
well as other laws. Forwarding proposal to competent bodies so that
laws, polices, regulations directions or practices to be amended are some
lists which is expected from the institution. The institution can even
propose the adoption of new directives, if it deems necessary.
Cumulative readings of article 6(1) and 19(2) (b) gives us a picture
that, during the existence of defective directives, the chief ombudsman
prepare and submit draft administrative legislations, givehis opinion on
those prepared otherwise. So the institution and its experts are in a
better position to identify the administrative problems for the study and
conducting research on the administrative. With regard to supervisory
power, its jurisdiction extends to national level,which is almost similar
to most countries, which have such institution. For example the Sweden
ombudsman, its power extends to government agencies and regional
government as well as the individual member of the staff. (18) The same is
hue with the Colombian public protection, it is a nation wide, and its
duties extend to in any part of the territory.U?'
In general, during supervision, the ombudsman acts as a watchdog
on the actions of executive organs. And the office may challenge the
constitutionality of any legislation or action or conduct of public sector if
it is unreasonable other wise ultra vires. (20) And advising the state on its
administrative function and recommending corrective measures to be
taken by legislating new laws or improving the existing ones, formulating
policies and advising on the lack of administrative practices.
3.4.2. Investigation
Article 6 (2) of the establishing proclamation states that the
institution shall have powers and duties to receive and investigate
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complaints in respect of maladministration. The way the Ethiopian
ombudsman. adopts is so much wise, in respect of investigation process,
this is because it is a two way mechanism, one the aggrievedpartiys by
him/her self come and givehis/her complaint. The other is investigation
can be held by the institution itself pursuant to article 24. Investigation
conducted only by receiving complaints has the followingdisadvantage.
One many disadvantaged groups may neither be aware of their rights nor
the means of enforcing them and this can be addressed if the
ombudsman is empowered to initiate inquires him self I herself. Two
certain categories of people such as prisoners held incommunicative,
children persons in mental asylums etc. Third, people may not dare
make complaints for fear of retaliation. Four, remoteness of place couple
with lack of the means to travel may make it impossible for a person to
lodge complaint expeditiously. (21) So to save from all the above danger it
is better to followthe two-waymechanisms.
With regard to the method of handling the complaint article 41(2)
of the proclamation states any person who causes harm to wittiness
before the institution or the persons having produced a document before
it shall be punishable with imprisonment from three to fiveyears or with
a fine from six thousand to ten thousand Birr or both, unless punishable
with more severe penalty under the penal law.
As far as lodging complaint concerned, a complaint may be lodged
with the institution orally, in writing, or in any other manner and
Complaints shall, to the extent possible be submitted together with
supporting evidence. According to article 23(1) and (2) the investigation
which the officeconducts leads it to get remedies according to article 6 of
sub 4. Seeking remedies is necessarily demands communicating and
negotiating with the appropriate minister, departments or body, which
caused the lodgingof the complaint. (22)
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Experiences of other countries show us, for example in Norway
when complaint is lodged to the officeof ombudsman, who is responsible
for assessing whether the complaint meets the procedural requirements
for treatment by ombudsman; that is, whether the case falls under the
jurisdiction of ombudsman, whether it is justifiable, whether it has been
lodged with in the time limit and whether other available remedies are
exhausted by the complaint before his case considered by ombudsman'P'
The requirement of exhaustion of remedies, like Ethiopian
ombudsman are also available in case of Zimbabwe, and Zambian
ombudsman. Inspector General of government of Uganda has a power to
seize document, Conduct search and subpoena wittiness and unlike ours
(Ethiopian ombudsman) it had the power to issue an arrest warrant for
failure to comply. (24) In Relation to time requirement for bringing action,
the Ethiopian ombudsman does not say any thing like the Swedish
counter part.
3.4.3. Report and Recommendation
Article 6(6) and 39 of the establishing proclamation talk about
what expected from the institution. Accordingly after the issue of
investigation exhausted the next step, as per article 39, is the institution
shall issue an official report. as may be necessary and also exercise
transparency in respect of its mode of operation, including issuance of
regular reports.
Public confidence on the institution can be developed if the
institution as much as possible transparent to the people and one way to
be transparent is reporting in due time. But this does not mean that,
reporting to be taken as the institution feels there is of course limitation,
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among this one is pursuant to the same article in sub 3, which states
that if endangers the national security and well- being or to protecting
individual lives, the institution should 110tbe transparent in respect of its
mode of operation, including issuance of regular report, which means the
institution power to publicizemust only be conditional.
In relation to recommendation, the institution recommends for the
revision of existing laws, practices or directives and for the enactment of
new laws and formulation of policies,with a viewto bringing about better
governance. Therefore, the final report of the ombudsman is
accompanied by a recommendation, and the institution cannot take any
sanction based on the finding of its investigations, rather than making
possible recommendations to the concerned authorities, furthermore, the
ombudsman only has power to express criticism and Issue
recommendation.
When we see experiences of some countries, the Uganda inspector
general government has power to investigate or cause prosecution in
respect of cases involving corruption, abuse of authority of pubic
office,(25)The Slovenian ombudsman, for example in its remedies,
propose the respective body should compensate that particular
individual for the damage that hel she has suffered due to the violation
or mal administration. (26)The ombudsman also propose that the
respective body make apologies to the aggrieved person for the
maladministration and in his final report the institution may propose the
instituting of disciplinary proceedings against the responsible official of
the respective body (27)(Asingle case decided by the officeis givenat the
back of this thesis). Generally, even if it differs from country to country,
the ruling or its recommendation is not binding. Finally the institution of
ombudsman even if it has all the above powers and duties (function) in
the follo-wing4{four)cases, the officelacks the power to investigate.
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1 Decisions given by councils established by election in their
legislativecapacity.
2 Cases pending in courts of law of any level.
3 Matters under investigation by the officeofAuditor general
4 Decisions given by security forces and units of the defense
forces, in respect of matter of national security or defense.
In relation to decisions given by the council, the office of
ombudsman do not have a power to investigate but this doesnot mean
that they are (elected council) also immune from investigation when they
are not in their legislative capacity. When these elected council function
ill the administrative purpose and if they commit or done
maladministration they fallwith the jurisdiction of the institution.
When we come to cases pending in court of law, judicial power is
vested with courts only according to article 79 of the constitution. So as
much as possible they have to be free from any control and have to be
independent but the same argument also applies to courts of law, means
if the judiciary as an independent body, when there IS
maladministration, like delaying the case there is no way that the office
of ombudsman keeps silent, when we see experience of some other
countries the same kind of procedure is followed.
As far as auditor general and security forces are concerned, both
are out of the jurisdiction of the institution, this is mainly because of the
fact that, top secret needed to the national interest, but here there is also
situation like the above case, when there exists ombudsman jurisdiction.
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3.4.4. Research
The establishing proclamation in its article 6(5) states that the
office of ombudsman undertake studies and research on ways and
means of curbing maladministration. The research activities. which the
office launches. may give it a batter insight to propose for the making of
new laws and formulation of better policies towards the desired end. The
idea of conducting research has its own advantage just to bring good
governance as well as to avoid maladministration. So conducting more
research helps to solve future as well as existing problems. and at the
same time enables one to know the very beginning cause of a problem.
Cumulative readings of article 19(2)(d)and 6(5) makes clear that, the
chief ombudsman is expected to undertake study of recurrent cases of
maladministration and forward together with remedial proposals to the
house.
3.5. Jurisdiction
There are times that people ask. to which body or which body is
appropriate enough for their grievance, Human right commission. office
of ombudsman. anti- corruption commission.
From the reading of article 29. we can understand that there is a
possibility of overlap of jurisdiction between Human Right commission
and the office of ombudsman. This is because the establishing
proclamation devotes some place. and this fear comes in to picture due
to the fact that both institutions are advocators of Human Rights.
So to avoid such overlapping jurisdiction. article 29 in sub (1)
forward the possible remedy pursuant to this article. where cases falling
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both under the jurisdiction of the institution and the Human Right
commission shall be determined up on their mutual consultation and the
second solution, if the first option fails, the organ before which the case
IS lodged shall undertake the investigation. Therefore as the
proclamation clearly states it is through the mechanisms of mutual
consent that the jurisdiction will going to be solved. but the issue is
during mutual consent as much as possible issue related with human
light have to go to the commission because of the fact that the lights
that are givenare by internal as well as international instrument.
Issues related with maladministration, even if in the practice of
maladministration. there also exist violation of Human Rights, and this
has to go to the officeof ombudsman. This is the possible expectation in
countries where there exists different institution.
With respect to anti- corruption commission. the commission have
the power to investigate corruption and when we examine the definition
of the corruption according to the establishing proclamation. there is a
term "Maladministration" and it is during this time. that the fear of
overlap of jurisdiction comes into picture and the establishing
proclamation (in both cases) keeps silent. So what will be the fate? The
possible remedy is to forward the case to anti corruption commission this
is because one. the binding effectof the office(ombudsman) is not a such
comparable with that of the commission (anti- corruption) and leaving
one without any remedy is not advisable so the commission has to have
the power to see the case as said earlier.
Experience of other country shows that. like the Ethiopian
ombudsman. national security are not under the jurisdiction of the office
in case of Colombia. (28) In United Kingdomombudsman (peA) designate
government department. which come under the jurisdiction of the
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office.(29)In case of Australia state ombudsman, courts and judges, the
cabinet and minister, the police and action of Auditor -General is
excluded from the ambit of the office. (30)
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
At this final Stage of this paper I will try to conclude what I have
already discussed in.the previous three chapters and I will look at some
foreseeable problems in practical application of this institution and I
tried to recommend on some important issues.
The institution of ombudsman, which has its origin in Sweden, has
a great impact on the avoidance of mal administration and good
governance. This institution has contributed a lot, in controlling the
executive body of government when they act beyond their power and
without goodreason. The institution of ombudsman can also be said that
it is one of the method by which Human Rights be protected as wellas it
supplement courts and administrative agencies in addressing the
grievances of citizens.
Apart from, judicial control, parliamentary control (whichare most
of the time known as traditional safe guards) the institution of
ombudsman has gap-fillingrole. In other words gaps that are created by
such institutions (Judicial control and parliamentary control) are more
likelybe filledby the officeof ombudsman
Based on the relevance of this institution to the world, Ethiopia
has also accepted this institution to be included to fight mal
administration and to develop the concept of good governance,which is
of course based its existence pursuant to article 55(15) of the FDRE
constitution. It aims at avoiding Maladministration and redressing
individual grievances resulted by the executiveofficials.
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In order to do what aimed to be done. obstacles should be avoided.
These obstacles either are from the nature of the establishing legislations
or from practical application of the legislations. So foreseeable problems
and some recommendation will be necessary to form the aimed
institution.
With regard to its independence. as it was included in the body
part. there are some doubtful issues. Appointment of officials by the
parliament and at the same time accountability to the legislature
(parliament) has its own advantage with respect to its independence.
But the case. get another picture when the parliament is much more
influenced by the executive in the appointment of the institution. This is
mainly due to the reason that in the parliament most seats are left for
the ruling party and executive members are also members of the
parliament. So the possible solution to avoid such gray area. it is better
to exclude executivebodies in the appointment process.
The other point that needs some recommendation is the issue of
criteria to be appointed as an ombudsman. pursuant to article 12 sub (2)
of the establishing proclamation. to be appointed as an ombudsman. the
following more than three criteria's are set. even if they are not
cumulative. and it is expected from an individual to get the office.among
this criteria's according to the proclamation. one is. a person who trained
(indifferent)relevant discipline. other than law. but this criteria, even if it
needs interpretation. which fields can fit this " relevant discipline" as to
the writer. it is some thing that do not have acceptance, this is because
when we see other countries experience and even the functions of the
office under the proclamation. it doesn't seems convincing. What is
meant in general is. it has to be a law graduate that should hold the
position. not other graduate pursuant to the establishing proclamation.
the chief ombudsman. for example, is expected to prepare and submit
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draft administrative legislation; give opinion on those prepared other
Wise. So how can one, for example, management or degree holder if we
consider this fields as "other relevant discipline" prepare administrative
legislation and even those person who get knowledgethrough experience,
how can they draft or other wise issues that have strong connection with
law. So with out prejudice to other staff members whether chief
ombudsman or deputy chief ombudsman has to be a lawyer, even with
alongwork experience because it is sensitive area.
The other is in relation to jurisdiction, both Human Right
commission and anti - corruption commission. As it was stated in the
body part there is of course overlapping jurisdiction with these
institution. Actually in relation to Human Right commission, since there
is such fear, the proclamation states some possible solution, by saying if
there is overlapping of jurisdiction, the question of which of them would
investigate shall be determined upon their mutual consultation or organ
before which the case is lodged shall undertake the investigation but
here what have to be considered is that not only mutual consultation
solve the problem, as much as possible maladministration in relation to
violation of Human Right has to go the commission, but other can be
entertained by the officeof ombudsman.
Still there is a question which organ take the initiation in case of
maladministration, this is because the proclamation states in sub two of
article 29, the organ before which the case is lodged shall undertake the
investigation, here initiation is taken by the aggrievedorgan not from the
institution, so the question is if the complain is not lodged to the
institution, which institution will take the responsibility, because both
institution do not only have the powerof receivingcomplaint but also the
power of supervision , by themselves. So the possible solution as to this
writer is, in case of supervision, as it stated in the proclamation to
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investigation, mutual consultation of the two institutions has to be
mandatory, as the onlyway out to tackle the problem.
The other, of course with the same issue, is jurisdiction in relation
to the anti- corruption commission even if it is not such burning issue in
relation to Human Right commission still there is some gray area with
the office of ombudsman. As it was tried to be recommended in the body
part, since there is a fear that when some maladministration is occurred
both institution may tried to givetheir opinion on the issue, because they
do have jurisdiction, the possible way out is to give priority to the anti
corruption commission because its ruling is binding unlike the office of
ombudsman which is not binding.
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A single Decided Case
It was repeatedly mentioned that, the Ethiopian ombudsman office
IS so young institution in relation to other countries office, which
established before centuries, it can be possible to say that, there was no
a such concrete effort to establish such institution, which is of course
seems mandatory when we see its great impact on the development of
good governance and avoidance of maladministration.
So the Ethiopia government because of its relevance to the
Ethiopian legal system established the institution in the year 2000. But
this institution come to exercise its function surprisingly after some
years, it was only on the paper that individuals knew the office,but after
some years it starts to work and, during visits to this office in different
time, the institution is still do not stand on its two legs due to various
reasons, entertaining a single case, is one indication for this matter. For
the sake of givingmore picture of this institution to the people who ask
"what are functions of this institution", the single case that was
entertained by the office is attached to this thesis and a very short
summery of this case is also given, the case reads as follows.
As it was told from the office, because of the fact that the person
who writes complaint to the office and the office to which complaint is
made should not be disclosed, the writer is forced to discuss on the issue
without naming participants in the litigation.
As the case at hand stipulates, the person who come up with the
complaint to the office, states that since he was fired from some
government officedue to the reason that during his stay in the officefor
Some 2 years, he was held to be liable on three maters civil. criminal and
discipline. By the judgment held is some years, the person who was
accused of such offence, was released free from the court both on civil
and criminal liability but he was held to be liable on discipline. but the
office denied to back him again and it was due to the above fact that the
"Aggrieved"person come up with his complaint, to the office to get back
him to his original place.
The office of ombudsman as it was given the power to receive
complains, started to investigate the case, and during its investigation,
the office, mainly focuses on two issues i.e. did the person fired with the
correct procedure or not and did the action of the office (which fired the
person) correct or not after the person be free both on civil and criminal
liability by the court. of course there are different issues that the office
deal on the process of solving the case, among this, it raises issues with
the proclamation that sighted by the office ( Labor proclamation) during
firing the person, members of committee for discipline or disciplinary
committee that was established by the office to assess the case of the
person, decisions of the federal civil service commission and
administrative courts, finally the officecome up with the conclusion that
there is mal administration on the person.
So the officeof ombudsman gives the followingrecommendation
·The person is expected to back to his job.
·Wageand rank of the person has to be given had it been on the job
·Annual leave, if it was not used, has to be given
So what it means is the office in its final judgment givepositive response
to the aggrievedperson.
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AllOt:: "
htLu h,}'1C Ml,rr CI.e O1'm& uu/n,:r f'.ltn:1tL '} J1otz.t ?··'U)T(J)· 14'lCf- (J)·Uf'/,
hilh.j'?~ f!:LiI Of'l'" 30/1989 q.9". Ock1'C LPh17/12/21 01''16. J1.>o~n,
UU:J'?~T(J)· U<>J,}f'1'h1't\ uuLf',·'} 1~*£Tlf"f'} .e?~HClA::
f'1~m& uu/n,:r f'.ltl\ 7tL '} J1otz.t Ohn,:r CI.e fl.e f'1'uuLPL1'(J)''} f',}>OLrr
£Tlf?·J1.Ahil uuC9"C' t\uuil&j' n,,p i1t- hilh.j'~ ClcpLO(J)'f'(J)·Uf"/,lJl'l>OUULPL:r
n'lrhl'b 19/1989 q.9". O<k1'C LPh17/12/25 O1''16~ J1.>o~n, hn,:r CI.e hilt-
h '}.ltf'l'10,p l'~C~A:: hn,:r CI.e9" O(J)·Uf'/,(J)·~>C OUULP7:J'T(J)' fll\ri.A f'lcri.i1
J1otz.''''} f'hil1'~J1.C ~/n,r)~ .e<>JCI~m.ecf>(J). O1'm& uu/n,,p v~.n. 7tL '} J1otz.t
f'1'f'lm(J)''} (J)·Uf'/, 001/08/90 q.9". O<k1'C 6005/4365/90 01''16. J1.>O~fl,fJf!:*A::
h tLU cpl'fto 0+m& uu/n,,p f'.It1\..,tL') J1otz.rf;'1 f'f'lri.A f'lCri.iI J1otz.7i'}
f'hil1'~~C ~/n,rr f'f'lm·rr'} (J).o/'/,?,l, hth?· h ,}'1C h ,}uuL9" t-fl,)::
f'uu'}<>JiI:r f'lt-1't1'r f'''tl\ 7tL '} 1'~rr h1'~1'CPt\ 1'>Ot\(J)' I\hf'lf'l· ?·J1.j'T(J)·
Of'uuf'l&j' n,,p O1'**uu, ','1'1 ?flA'I~~ f'.ltl\ 7tL '} J1otz.rl;?'"f 1'uuC9DC' ~'hn<f
(J).....,'/, tLf'ltTJT(J)' h '} s:otz.?CI U<>J j'liA:: ?·~j'T(J)· f'otz.:J'.efl T(J)' f'uu,}<>Jilr)~
f'lt-1't1'"f9" hcpLOClT(J)' hil t-°/T(J)·'} CI<>JClO·h'}.lthflh~ hf!:A tLf'ltTJT(J)'
h'}~otz.?CI U<>J.e~~<>J'?A::
hfl.e hmcpil',(J)' uuf'lt-:J'<f uuCLf":{' h'}'1C f'1'm& uu/n,rr f'.ltl\ 7tL '} J1otz.t,}
(J)·Uf'/, i1,}uuL9"C O(J)·....,'/,(J)·(J)'i11' f'1''}fJfILcp OCI-J;:J~thfJ?"f h,}~fl' fluu?,}H>O
"ffl'1A: :
t\h>o',:r j'UA f'.ltl\ 7tL ') J1otz.rf;(J).'} h(J),4>cpC i1,}?uu<>J9" hn,r)~ CI.e O1'm&
uu/n,rr t\1'uuLPL1'ClT(J)' hil MLU' .ltl\ 7tL '} J1otz.rl; Of'lm·rr uuAiI fl.e
h '}~mcpf'l·:r t\1'hf'lf'l'O:r f'o9"~rr £Tlf?·J1.Ahil /f',}>OLrr =n J1.A/ 9"h,} j':" '1T(J)'
I-Jfl·:r uul-JhA 0f'1.1t(J)· f'1'f'lf11T(J)' U?(J)1' f'hfl~fT(J)· :rolil1 uuLf',·'} m:"f'l(J)·
h~tLU (It\~fT(J)· uul-JhA 0(J):",p f''111~rr £Tlfohfl<f uu,:Jln hil1'~~& f",Ot;.:r
h.y. uu'1 ~'}~'} 1'mj'cf! hj'~L?' f'.ltl\ 7tL '}..J1otz.rf;(J). tcu» <>Jflf'l>O,}OhClA~rr
h:"~ ",(J)' (J).""'"/,(J).')f'f'lm(J)':: .eu J1.<>Jquhfl.e f'mcpil",(J)''} Of'uu,}<>Jilrruuilt-j'
n,,p f'otz.**uu· f'''tl\ 7tL '} J1otz.t?'l' ?flA1'~ uuLf'} .e?ClTCPA f'otz.t\(J)''} uuCth
f'f11f'l ',(J)'::
flA(J)' f'.ltl\ 7tL '} J1otz.-eo» i1t-(J).'} OOtZ.f'lt-O:r (J):"+ O1'hl'l7i'1 Ohl'l7i uul-JhA
f'cpLO·:r') hil'1 uuhflhj' huuLuuL O:tfl. ,1'ht-l-J& (J)?'l"f j'A1'iI£Tlfuu'Orr')
/r-tI-JI-J~Or1/ l}:~ "/1C h1~~1I'1' nflcf>~qu OOlJm-fTlr OlJfll.;QJ11"f1'1
ooht--htYJ11"f1 ooooCooC h1~nt1Cl OU"J -t~ 1"J:}t\:: htLU n1'C r1'mt
00/o,r1 r.ltc'l.71\.1 J'lnt1: nOt--C fl'1f!, Om:"1: -thtt 7i /YV-1 nfl,r Clf!,/ h'1 htt 7i
/YV-1 +rnz oo/o,rf./ ool-Jht\ mOl.m- r.ltc'l.71\.1 nfl I'\f!, ~'nr c'l.0'1' r1-~~1
l}:~ ~1C O~lI'1'~r ttYmfTl oolf~- rt\:" UfM ~m-:: -tht--I-Jt rlf~- m1e:'"f
r-tIlY~Orr1 mf!,r r-tI-JI-J~Orr1 ~11'1' ttf!,;rm:" l}:rrrhCf m-Uf'1, Ilooflmr
rntYfl"ft\ ?OCoot-- 0lJ~1."J nf!,~~t\r:: f!,U1 U"J rntYtlm-1 p',-flC}rr
Uff!,h-tt\ O.ltc'l.71\.1 J'lnt1: r-tOmm-1 m-Uf'1,-tt-- ~'1'C 2 Ilnll'lr h1m:"UfIl1:-
till1 OTI.JIlfOt PTl.Jl-r lilt.. T I1r Ot..IIJTIll- P711. J!Itt. 'f 1111UllIId,Pl/,;fr "I U't Ill-
PTt.hn+"I 11"1.1£PfC IIOR/ PbtJ!" IIlt..Tf 7-J!1I- U''f P7QIll-"I IlUll IJINI' AJ!"C7-
,PtlII7QIll-"I IlUll Il"lJlIl7Q AJ!"C7- OUll'lIj.Tj III IlUII-"I 1l"lJ!Tt.hDh-'f rt JIU"I"I IItJ!"
OUlllld,P I/,;f r"l OUllth 11 1IJ!t.bill- ,}J!"lIt Tm,Pt/! All U"'tP" II.II-P":
U. 1l1J"IP"1IJ,P1I7J!"JlTIll-Ot..4TIll- Pillf frf}1j. btJ!""! ,Pmt..t.Jl.Tj III1Ullt.hQTIll-
Pi.t.1I1I-OUllU'}:
11. r'7C Pi.mt.QTIll-Tj ,PtlUll}Ot 1I.U"'t 'fC IIUllIO.1: hAlf"l o&t ,Prf't.n+
Pri'tf.;f btJ!" QIlUll'ft.:"
hl'\f!, 0'1':"0- r-tcf>oomm- rm-Uf~J(hUfll r1-t'11 fl100Ilh-tm- nfl,rr Clf!, Ort-mt
oo/o,r rol'\f!, rhl'\6.J111' rr6WH hUfrm- 0t\1l-0rr rt\1'\ oo/o,r ot---tc;o"f 111l.r
1'l.nOm- oo~~ oomt--l.~ 1 ~m-:: r.ltc'l.71\.1 J'lnt1:rn- m-Uf'l. U1m'1' r1'mt
oo/o,rr rol'\f!, ~1'\6.J11';j'"r)'6'111 00(;><;'1nre:' OtLV- rr6'111 rn1Y+ ~\o,+ Cl.e
1<>~l).,t\ rntll-r1 r 001"Jfl+ 1111.+ nf!,cf>Ollm-r:: rOlJf!,cf>0t\0+ rn1 y+r
no,+ Clf!, rt\1'\ oo/o,rr r111l.r hCnnll 0~~1 Ylln1~"f "J~;r Ot--ttrm- l}::J>~
O-tmt oo/o,rr r1·0l.rr Cnnll 0" ~ I'\f!, -tnllm- 0006~1.OlJrm- ',m-:: h tLU I'\f!,
no,+ Clf!, 001'\f!, nll~;frm- flllnll001 ~~rm- r.ltc'l.71\.1 J'lnt 1:m- YfTlt--m- 'I1C
rllr:: ;r.ltY 0t\1'\ 00/0,:" O'I~ -tmt--cf!. no,rr Clf!, 0t\1l-0+ hUlrm-
Ontyo-t~~<;.+ 00,:JH1 m-fl'1' h1.ltt--1l}: +6'111 h+nrn CnnO- u,:JCf oot\n
h1.ltf!, 11 O-tmt oo/o,rr O',~ I'\f!, h1.lt 11l0'1' h'1 +s.cs» h1.ltcf>ClIl'\rm-
nYH-r 111\-00100+ rntYfl"ft\ nf!,~llr::
OtLU oot\h· -toocrC' r4'I.Om- r.ltc'l.71\.1 J'lnt1:m- rm-Uf'1, 'ittll YIlr1r
-t :J>m-qu O-tmt 00/0,+ flt-- nfl~Y~ 6~*t\::
::\1.'7V± lJ-1-H.~uoVt-~.fIuo VLvJ Q\1loU t/I/9"'l QcI>t'< loO *bJl}
-',rd J'hU,tp*~J .'7'1. ~.fI\1~t'l. J~~ \1;t'laoJ 06*1l *VIwV JU~ 064lJ-7c1>v'<
J4J4 Jl}U lJ-~~ J4J4J t (J'LJ *'U'< J Lvw(J'1n *(J'V+ ~lJ-<t19 ?4J4 ~LJlo(J'J
: :\:1vlJ-* -w', t-WllU,7c"va J4J4 Jl}U ±a5~7l}1w .'7±.J4J4 -w*lclJ-7cl>a
*'U/~ J'J'~+l}a 'laoV ~LJlo(J'V J067uo(J'1n Jbt'< -WlJ-<t1911t'J(J'-~ .'7LvWaln *(J'V
~lJ-<t19 t*U1ilclc+J o6(J'W t*U'JaV+J -WJ:Lr:lo-uoU (J'LJ *'U'< .'7'1. / <t19V
l}\1uoJ/ *'U/uo ?w+J ~V1) Y.1n-W -s» ~LJlo(J' (J'LJ *'U'<U 4'U/~ J'J'~+l}a
,,-----ifIiU J-m:/:!/J/11Il1I
-m:/:I1'l1J +~ifbr/l+ !.?.ilImU +?1fI111lSfr£ !/II 6~£'i/J''ll/rt//rt//If/'!IJ -m:/:!/J/11IlU
oQ~Q/1mJ aLlM Q1tV oQ~+lf/ ~ 1m1/ "'l1J. l11tU 3rt/II d:.JlhIfV d:llaL~ 311311J"
tVlnc~Wt'l. Y.ln-W t4'U/~ J'J'~+l}a
::\1~lo'J'(J' ~<7~
(J'LJ *'Ua -/,to(J' '1,In-W 064'U/~ J';j'~+l}a \1cb'&\1~ (J'v -W*~4'U'<U (J'LJ *'U'<
t,wJ:vLJuo 06\1±*'< lJ-7~1w ~7l}1w t,wlllJ-7cl>va /:J.'laolf t V!..1)1J'J/ J4J4
Jl}U 4'U/~ 06?4ab 1J -UJcI>aV LI:'U/~ J'J'~+l}a l}11JV \1111) \1JJ~"'?V ~7l}1w
to(J' -U7c~IwU *'U/uo ?WLI--V ;tlJ- *J.L? JJuoJo6 * 1J'~{J t-wJlna'laoJ *V-~
"'V~t~ ?+1J'~ 'WVlouo to(J' o6t.fl1J -IUaa JL 4J.L? *1J'l<ll ±a5'WVlouo
t-WJ:'<-Va -W~ *at406 4V-~ *7lJ-tV *'Yu -W*IwT?uoll t*J.L?
LI:1J'~J *'U/uo ?W+J *U-~.fIJ ~aw+ /(J'IJ ~LJlo(J'/ !l\,111+ J4J4 -W~7'J'+U
\111lcuo /*'U/uo ?w+/ !l\,111U .'7'1. /(J'LJ *'UlN !llnll+U 4'U/~ J'J'~LI--l}a
::tVvc~Wt 'I. t*-VLI--ll'laoJ \10a *~lJ-'<V
::\:1!JV± lJ-l-It~uoV *U'V~t 'I. ±-A'V.'i)'-~*bJl}-trd J .'i)'t~t'< *llVuotl) t'l,In-W
*'U/~ J'J'~+l}a t!l'laolf l}11JV \1111) \1JJ~"'? J JL lJ-lntp -W~v~lc (J'vll
: :*UV'< ~Uwuo t4~~+\1V~ !Jb~ *'U/~
·w~U'J'uo 'J't'l. o6?JJV'<U ::\1cbLJ~(J' \1+11uo (sampooor.j) *bJl}-~rd JJJVa
t-WV±lJa'laoJ *Wl}uoV Y.1n-W ;btp*~ *'U/~ J'J'~LI--l}a 1it~ta'l. ?dl'laoVl)
·W·I--4+ t±*'U/~ ~U'J'uoJ ±-A''U/~ J'J'~+l}a lJ-~/, -WLJ~'laoJ l}cI>WV (J'v 011'1.
: :tVJJ 067uot 'I.
'1,In·W t·WWV+J *'U/~ J'J'~+l}a t!l'laolf l}11JV \1111) \1JJ~"'?J tV~cI>
OlTDUJli: Ylli'~.l'.C li:/o,rr or hlli'~.l'.C lTDlltY o,rr llt't1\OJ- ~\ot-C ri'7i1\ "}"}tfo,
h"}~t'trOJ- ;r9"lJ c'L**9" hlTD.l'.O;;:OJ-li:/o,f.r f,A:r 1lI\rlTDlltyo,;rrOJ- li:+rhLf
OJ-Of'" I\lTDllm+ rort.Yll rA f1.4>rr ht'trOJ- i'f1I\" ;r9"lJ "OJ-:: Clot-t-;fOJ-9"
tJ1ne; .pAtTJ4. h"}-'tV-9" li:rrhq~ OJ-Of'" I\lTDllmrr rort.Yllrl\- p',-llC~rr
lTDhi'A f, '7Clr'PA:: v t..,Q.,t-A c'Lri.A oCri.ll Yll i'~.l'.C li:/o,rr r lTD.l'.O;;:OJ-"}li:C~
o,rr ~\UJt-C (Procedures) hl'f1~ I\lTDhi'A Cl.l'.'7lOJ- l'lrr yo,rr Clf,"} lTDUJl;rLf
lTDflrr (substantive rights) OIJOftTJi: '1''70. hf,.l'.I\9"::
1/ Incidental procedural matters must not kill substantive rights"
rort.I\OJ-"} lTDCUYAi'hi'1\ OJ-Of'" ~OJ-:: Ot..,Q.,t-A I'bri.A oCri.ll tJort.'(j"}Yll-t~.l'.C
li:/o,rr ri'omOJ- OJ-Of',,::
Or"};r'b lTD"}o.yr"} t'tf, 1--j',I'le;rOJ-e; hV-"} vYI1~OJ- '7-~f, lTDOl;rLf ',l'(lr
rlTD;e:lTDtYOJ-"} ht'tf, Oi'lTDl\hi'OJ- lTDAh- hi",i'"}"} OJ.l'. V-I\i';;:OJ- ',l'f1
he; lTDt-I\"}::
OV-I\i';;: .l'.li{ r9""}lTDl9" lOJ- li:~ ','7C OlTD"}o.yr"} t'tf, h"} .l'.mcf'll'/O)- ·tmt
lTD/o,rr OM1T Clf, t'tf, hlTDUJli'OJ- nll· ho,rr Clf, hOJ"};e:I\- nll9" f,V-"}
hli:rrhflth.C no- ',~ lTDOJ-tTJ;rrOJ-"} ylTD~OJ- '7-~f, ',OJ-::
hi'*OIJr"} i'AtJe; llAtTJ"} hJ;l,f Oli:/o,f.r ri'omOJ-"} OJ-Of'" i'lTDAO"} 1\000rr
h"}t.A,,}9U:: li:/f1f.r rort.om-r OJ-PI'" rlTDlilibl7ie; hll'7~:e:- h"}.l'.lf~ he; li:/o,f.r
rort.om-rr"} OJ-Of'" lTD7iC rort.fl\OJ- Oth"} Oi'Hl;JOJ- rf,"}Cl~ llC~rr f1f h'H)_lf~
i'*OIJr"} f,'7',HClA Y9""}O;rA9"::
O-f'mt lTDlltY o,rr r -'tc'L71\."} tJOll.t ;r f,rf. ~\f1r)' Clf, hllt- h "}-'tUJe;o-t:
ri'.l'.l '7Orr cpe;OJ- '7-~f, vlTD/o,i:"} "}f1l+ OOIJ'7-.l'.A~OJ-:: ','7C -n f,U"}',- '7-~f,
i'"}i'C(I OlTD.l'.o;;:li:/o,+ ho,rr Clf, hi'hUJo-Orr rh9"',rr OIJ'7-.l'.AOJ"};e:A ',~
c'LOJm- li:/o,i: rOll.hi'I\OJ-"} hllli:Z: A:: h "}m:rOfI\"}
"O.fllf iI.fI PI11J.7011thfll1 Oll1J"It/lUJt/lh'lJ!t m-h'r ,}.J!'lIt 11.hltt dJlrl1P" .fill-
ll1JIJl.flI'll1JJIffl1h011U''!-P"111/rfI'r'rt, dttl11J.oU't lH.;f l'1'hfmt 0011U''!-1'hUJif"l
'r4.1'1'/ ll1J.J!'t.'7 dhT;Jd hllU't 1'000hl/h,J'P"hht, 1'01lm dllJll1J:ti U''l' 0011711:
nA.+f-A",PDJ"!J!lIf II11PIII 117 JIlt-hC9+ A"!tIlH' 149/.2/ 1I11/J/t.+1-hUJ(f Ti1-'1
AJII!r1-P'l.fill"! nt'! Ah'i.fl1-'iI1::"
W},q.o- n'?t.\~ h1Y.-t1l\fJro- rdD1'?fl+ 111l+ r?oy'l\ro- n~fl,+ Cl,e '1't}.r} Uf,etf1
ndDfltY fl,~ liCtJCtJ ~ot-c sP'tJ1yr} h1Y.tf'l YI'tYt.\::
,eU1~- 1-p.,,e rnl\m rl1'l.Yml]tJCt.\ 1 ~'1'11 M1+ Cl,e n~'+l1'l,c h-thOO-Or} tJfl
fLmr<1! ~,e1ClsP' a.t.\ r~C'sP' Y mq.tt,e ~/fl,~' 04'1 30/05/94 WPl\ro- "fftor}
romro-1 ro-Uf'l, h 1mq.Ufl\1::
«: - - P+rJd-1lJohd- IlllU r1+hh+1lJoT7C P"h"l,PT D.nP" +hILl! .eU"I'"
~P7r1B hUBh.'i mJ! UBh.'i ~UrJ ~P+"" ~II.+CTP" ~"IJ!+UBH' A.J!"C71lJo
OUBt/lmC~"III.g. O'Pf."I AhOIlJo"'i't.n+ O+h"lil- tI.e 'NIT r11111.J!"t.hIIrJllt
ntllc ,}J!'lI+ Ahh+!1.11r1.J'h~ POfTI1 AJI.I!lIP'l::"
~fl,+ Cl,e ~1-~NPt.\ r-tCll\ro- rdD1'?fl+ 111l+ n+rnz dD/fl,+ Yot-c "f'?c
r10 Y.l\ dDtf~- htt,e O-tm4'O-+ ~'l] 1l\t.\ -t'1 ~/fl,+"f -tl.?'?flJ.t.\::
O'ittu ~/fl,+"f v+nrno» ro-Uf'1. Ml?p.,~ hdDtf'I-sP' ~1'C O-tdDUfUf,e r111lr}
0IJ1-Y.t.\ tJfl r-troOy.ro- ~fl-tp.,Y.t-'f rflt- fl111r} hffl s.1.+ sP'1 dDtf1 ,e1WPt\?
r"t.l\ ro- rOIJ4' '1' l\ rn- '1'Y <f: ~ "f1 'Irn-: :
l\-tmt dD/fl,~ r.ita. 7fL 1 Pl1'l.1; (J)-Uf'1.dD'/7i rtf'/ro- sP'tJ1yr}l] O~fl,r} Cl,e tt,e
r-tdDLPl-tro- r111l+ 0IJ1-Y.t\ tJfl 0'i<Jl] 1l\t\-t'1 ~/fl,+ ~fl,+ Cl,e fLmr<f!O+
v l1'l."f t.\ 111l r} ~t.\ 1"Y.l\sP' h -tCll\ r.it a. 7 fL1 P"t.1;rn- rn-Uf'I. v l1'l.~ sP'0+ ao lP l r}
rl\ro-sP':: ~<Jl] 1l\t.\-t'1 ~/fl,T"f ~fl,+Cl,e Y?oY.l\-r} 111l+ rl\sP' us« r.ita. 7l\. 1
Pl1'l.1;ro- ro-Uf'l, O-tdDUfUf,e 0011 (cause) ~fl,+ Cl,e1 -tmY<l! l\YY.C,? rl1'l."ft.\0+
ru'?sP' ,eV-1 r~dD1tJr- dDlPl+ rt'ro-sP'::
fll\ttu +rnz dD/fl,r} ~\fl,+ Cl,e roY. fllr dDt.\O-~ l1l\ro- Omro/.r} dDlPl+ ~fl,r}
Cl,e1 ttl\dDdDl\fl rm4'oro- rdD1'?fl+ ot--t'1'"f Y.111 ~14'7\ 88/2/ ~fl,+ Cl,e1
h1p.,,edDl\0- fll\OIJ,ehl\tJttTro- O-t(J.),l''1tsP' 1o~l).,t.\ rrf'Cll\ro- rdD1'?fl+ 111lr)'1
-t1-tC(\ r-tom rflt- fl111r} ro-Uf'l, O~/fl,+ r1°y.l\ 111lr} rl\sP' ~fl,r)- Cl,e
t\.mro/. ~,e1ClsP' -t11{\" O-troO'1 111, Yl\sP'1sP' -t~OIJt dDdDtY (automatically)
~fl,+ Cl,e1 roY.flt- dDdDl\O- hu,?sP' ,eV-1 h~dD1tJr- ~1<JC +m, ~OC:: Ottu
l 1s: -tmt dD/fl,+ ~fl,r} Cl,e l\mro/.+ roY.flt- t.\dDl\fl '1'yc~ tt,e OdD.?o.r}
9/1997 q.9". O<P.~C H1/fJJh17/1S/n r1'1&.m· ~oO~fb &.7\qo U"l1 Yt\-th-tfl'1
hfbr '1.e m~ ilt- h 1~.eonfll'l· r£T1l.hflht!\ h 1~"f' 9"h1 Yr on~'f>iI Y t!\;J~fl~m·::
lIlIt DLl ~tt fl
ht\.e Or1;t''bm' h~t!\ h1~oOt-t-',m' hfbr '1.e hilt- (L1'lC:;0-t:r1'mt on/fbr}
r.ctl\ 7fL 1 p£T1l.1;C:;rl\Qt!\ I'lCQiI p£T1l.7i1 r hil1'~~C ~/fb1' Ol'lm·r), m'Uf'/,f11'f
t\.e OCt"J;J' uoP'f h1~fl' rhl:try"f'1 rf'1111f).t!\:: htLU Orf'bt),tryt hfbr}'1.e Orf'mt
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